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Recent years have seen a number of developments pertaining to the notion 
that victims should be afforded a ‘voice’ in the criminal justice system. The 
theoretical and structural parameters of the adversarial system are not, 
however, conducive to exercising such a role. For many, conferring 
procedural rights on victims jeopardises the due process rights of the 
accused, as well as the public nature of the criminal justice system. In light of 
the recent decision to roll out the ‘Victims’ Focus Scheme’ across England 
and Wales, this article explores a number of issues of principle that arise – not 
least the deeper policy implications of an apparent re-alignment of the 
normative parameters of the criminal justice system to incorporate the private 
interests of third parties. 
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Victims and the Sentencing Process: Developing Participatory Rights?  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Over the course of the last 30 years or so, the problems facing victims in the 
criminal justice system have become ever more apparent. Successive 
governments have sought to capitalise on the lucrative political appeal of the 
crime victim,1 and have implemented a range of reforms primarily targeted at 
providing additional support and protection for victims. As Ashworth has 
observed, more has been promised than delivered in recent years in relation 
to victim services,2 though on the whole such reforms have received a 
relatively warm reception. However, the idea of conferring procedural rights 
on victims of crime (ie, the notion that they should be allowed to participate in 
the criminal process) has always proved much more contentious.  
 
The concept of victim participation is nothing new; as long ago as 1990, 
probation officers, using either CPS papers or victim statements, were obliged 
to assess and comment on the impact of the consequences of the offence on 
victims in their pre-sentence reports.3 This scheme was effectively expanded 
in October 2001 with the introduction of the Victim Personal Statement 
Scheme (VPSS),4 which required the police to inform victims of the right to 
                                                          
1 On the potentially political appeal of the crime victim, see further G Geis, ‗Crime victims—
practices and prospects‘ in A Lurigio, WG Skogan and RC Davis (eds), Victims of Crime: 
Problems, Policies, Programs (Newbury Park, CA, Sage: 1990); D Garland, The Culture of 
Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001); CA Warner and JL Rudolf, ‗Mandatory Compensation Orders for Crime Victims and 
the Rhetoric of Restorative Justice‘ (2003) 36 Aust NZJ Criminol 60. 
2 A Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd 
ed,, 2005), 353. 
3 National Standards, National Standards for the Supervision of Offenders in the Community 
(London: Home Office, 2000). 
4 Home Office, Victim Personal Statement Scheme: Circular 35/2001, (London: HMSO, 
2001). The VPSS was introduced notwithstanding research evidence reflecting problems in 
the pilot projects; see C Hoyle, R Morgan & A Sanders, The Victims’ Charter: an evaluation of 
pilot projects (London: Home Office, 1999). Any VPS had to be in the form of a section 9 
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include comments about the impact of the offence in any statement they may 
make.5 In September 2005, the Government was persuaded that it should 
take the concept of victim allocution one step forward, and decided to pilot the 
use of ‗family impact statements‘ in court. This was to allow the families of 
victims of murder or manslaughter to make an oral statement on the impact of 
the offence, post conviction but before sentence was passed. Thus, the 
Victims‘ Advocates Scheme (VAS) was established in five Crown court 
centres, and ran from April 2006 to April 2008.6  
 
This article examines the VAS and its repackaged successor, the Victim 
Focus Scheme (VFS), against emergent international trends and the apparent 
realignment of the normative parameters of the criminal justice system. In 
particular, we consider the impact of how the ‗public‘ nature of criminal justice 
processes has been increasingly exposed to private interests, thereby 
exposing ideas about crime and punishment to more holistic understandings 
of concepts of harm, fault, retribution and reparation. These shifts are not 
without consequence: the capacity of the adversarial system to accommodate 
a proactive role for the victim is highly apposite – given its inherent conception 
as a two-way conflict between the state and the offender. The victim, it would 
seem, now stands on the brink of recapturing this conflict.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
witness statement or in an expert‘s report and served on the defence before sentence was 
passed: the sentencing court should take into account, as far as it considered appropriate, 
―the consequences to the victim‖; see Practice Direction (Victim Personal Statements) [2002] 
Cr App R (S) 482. 
5 However, since 2005, the Victims‘ Code of Practice ceased to require the police to inform 
victims of this right other than in cases of murder and manslaughter:  Home Office, Hearing 
the Relatives of Murder and Manslaughter Victims: Consultation Document (London: HMSO, 
2005). 
6 The pilot centres were the Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey), and the Crown Courts at 
Birmingham, Cardiff, Manchester and Winchester. Effectively, the VAS has now been 
superseded by the Victim Focus Scheme (originally announced by the Attorney-General in 
October 2007) which continues to enable the families of murder and manslaughter victims to 
work with prosecutors on the preparation of an impact statement which is subsequently read 
out in court. 
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II. Rights of Participation: the Arguments and Counter-arguments  
 
The potential drawbacks and benefits of participatory mechanisms have 
received considerable attention in the literature. Before rehearsing these 
arguments, it is worth emphasising that empirical studies tend to suggest that 
victims do not actually seek decision-making power.7 By contrast, they tend to 
prioritise recognition, acknowledgement and some form of participatory role.8 
To this end, a range of empirical studies confirm that victim participation 
increases satisfaction with justice through giving victims a sense of 
empowerment and official, albeit symbolic, acknowledgement.9 
                                                          
7 See eg J Shapland, J Willmore, and P Duff, Victims and the Criminal Justice System 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1985); Justice, Victims in Criminal Justice, Report of the Justice 
Committee on the Role of Victims in Criminal Justice (London: JUSTICE, 1998); J Wemmers 
and K Cyr, ‗Victims‘ Perspectives on Restorative Justice: How Much Involvement Are Victims 
Looking For?‘ (2004) 11 IRV 259. 
8 DG Kilpatrick, D Beatty and S Smith Howley, The Rights of Crime Victims—Does Legal 
Protection Make A Difference? (Washington DC: US Dept of Justice, 1998). It may be noted, 
however, that data from a number of participatory initiatives, such as restorative justice 
schemes and victim statement schemes do contain relatively low take-up rates by victims 
(see eg R. Morgan, and A. Sanders, The Use of Victim Statements (London: Home Office, 
1999); Newburn, T, Crawford, A, Earle, R,  et al. The Introduction of Referral Orders into the 
Youth Justice System, Home Office Research Study 242 (London: Home Office, 2001); 
Hoyle, C, Young, R, and Hill, R (2002) Proceed with Caution: An Evaluation of the Thames 
Valley Police Initiative in Restorative Cautioning (York: Rowntree, 2002). However, this may 
be because of the way in which such schemes were implemented in practice. For an excellent 
overview of what ‗participation‘ should entail, see I Edwards, ‗An Ambiguous Participant: The 
Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making‘ (2004) 44 BJC 967. 
9 See eg. H Kury and M Kaiser, ‗The Victim‘s Position within the Criminal Proceedings— An 
Empirical Study‘ in G Kaiser, H Kury, and H-J Albrecht (eds), Victims and Criminal Justice: 
Legal Protection, Restitution and Support (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute, 1991); E Erez and 
E Bienkowska ‗Victim Participation in Proceedings and Satisfaction with Justice in the 
Continental Systems: The Case of Poland‘ (1993) 21 JCJ 47; Shapland et al, above n 7; E 
Erez, L Roeger and F Morgan, ‗Victim Harm, Impact Statements and Victim Satisfaction with 
Justice: An Australian Experience‘ 5 (1997) IRV 37. A study of victims in the Dutch criminal 
justice system has also suggested that many victims feel that procedures which even allow 
passive participation in the criminal trial carry a certain symbolic importance for many victims 
which, in turn, can reduce feelings of exclusion and unfairness: J Wemmers, Victims in the 
Criminal Justice System (Amsterdam: Kugler, 1996), 338. 
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Calls for enhanced participatory rights for victims have rested on various 
different arguments. It is alleged, for example, that more meaningful 
participation contributes to overall levels of victim satisfaction and thereby 
bolsters the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole.10 From a 
moral standpoint, it has been suggested that it is only right that victims have 
an opportunity to play a role in the delivery of punishment, since this can 
provide some measure of reassurance to them that they have public 
recognition and support.11 On a more pragmatic level, it might be added that 
such statements ensure that courts are presented with a more complete 
picture of the crime and are thereby better placed to sentence the offender 
and order reparation to the victim.12  
 
Yet even if we accept, wholly or partially, the validity of these arguments, we 
cannot escape the fact that victims‘ participatory rights are inherently foreign 
to the normative parameters of the English criminal justice system. In a 
seminal article, Nils Christie outlined an historical pattern, whereby the state 
‗appropriated‘ the criminal conflict from the victim and thereby transformed a 
private dispute between individuals into a transgression against the state.13 
Thus the parameters of ‗criminal‘ behaviour are laid down by the state to 
punish conduct that is deemed to be sufficiently injurious to the public at large. 
In this sense, the interests of the victim in common law systems are notionally 
                                                          
10 See eg N Walker and M Telford, Designing Criminal Justice: The System in Comparative 
Perspective, Report 14, Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland (Belfast: 
HMSO, 2000); C Brennan, ‗The Victim Personal Statement: Who is the Victim?‘ (2001) 4 Web 
JCLI. 
11 A Cretney and G Davis, Punishing Violence (London: Routledge, 1996) at 178; M Cavadino 
and J Dignan, ‗Reparation, Retribution and Rights‘ (1997) 4 IRV 233. 
12  S Hillenbrand and B Smith, Victim Rights Legislation: An Assessment of its Impact on 
Criminal Justice Practitioners and Victims (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1989); J. 
Chalmers, P Duff, and F Leverick ‗Victim impact statements: can work, do work (for those 
who bother to make them)‘ [2007] Crim LR 360.  
13 N Christie, ‗Conflicts as Property‘ (1977) 17 BJ Crim 1. For a critique of this argument, see 
J Gardner, ‗Crime: in Proportion and in Perspective' in A. Ashworth and M. Wasik (eds.), 
Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).   
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conceptualised as falling outside the criminal law, and should instead be 
pursued through the civil courts. The function of the victim within the criminal 
justice system is primarily instrumental; those who have suffered the primary 
effects of victimisation have been ‗conscripted‘ into an operational role of 
assisting the criminal justice system in bringing offenders to justice.14 This 
conception both denigrates victims15 and also tends to portray their rights and 
interests in discrete and opposing terms to those of offenders.16 Moreover, 
such a view also highlights an underlying tension in the relationship between 
victims and Crown Prosecutors. Certainly, as far as the VAS is concerned, the 
very idea of victims relying on their own counsel is fundamentally alien to the 
adversarial tradition – at least since its ‗adversarialisation‘ in the nineteenth 
century.17 To date, victims have traditionally been dependent upon the Crown 
Prosecutor to safeguard their interests. Prosecutors, in turn, are required to 
perform a juggling act, combining their normative roles as ‗a minister of 
justice‘ pursuing the public interest with distinct obligations to support third 
parties.18 Indeed, in Sweeting et al‘s partial evaluation of the VAS in 2007,19 it 
was apparent that the potential for conflict was a significant concern in the 
eyes of some of the practitioners, particularly given the prosecution‘s duty to 
                                                          
14 D Faulkner, Crime, State and Citizen (Winchester: Waterside Press, 2001), p 226. 
15 A Duff, ‗Restoration and Retribution‘ in A Von Hirsch, J Roberts, AE Bottoms, et al (eds), 
Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2003). 
16 J Dignan, Understanding Victims and Restorative Justice (Maidenhead: Open University 
Press, 2005). 
17 See further JH Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
18 See R v Banks [1916] 2 KB 621, where the court held, citing R v Puddick (1865) 4 F & F 
497, that ‗prosecuting counsel should regard themselves as ministers of justice assisting in its 
administration rather than advocates‘ (at 499). See further J. Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human 
Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third Parties (Oxford: Hart, 2008), at 
118.  
19 A Sweeting, R Owen, C Turley et al, Evaluation of the Victims’ Advocate Scheme Pilots, 
Ministry of Justice Research Series 17/08 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2008). See also P. 
Rock, ‘Hearing Victims of Crime‘: The Delivery of Impact Statements as Ritual Behaviour in 
London Trials for Murder and Manslaughter‘ in A.E. Bottoms and J. Roberts (eds) Victims in 
the Criminal Justice System (Cullompton: Willan, 2009). 
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disclose information about the victim that the family may not wish to 
publicise.20  
 
On a theoretical platform, the state is conceived as the notional ‗victim‘, whilst 
those who have actually suffered the primary consequences of the offending 
behaviour are viewed as awkward outsiders to the process.21 On this basis, 
commentators have warned that schemes like the VAS, alongside other 
participatory mechanisms, would fundamentally distort the public nature of the 
criminal justice system or would interfere with the protection of the rights of 
accused persons and offenders.22 More specifically, it has been contended 
that victim participation is morally inconsistent with the traditional rationales 
underlying sentencing.23 In particular, concerns have been addressed as to 
whether it is legitimate for sentence to vary in accordance with the potentially 
unforeseeable results of an offender‘s conduct. It is thus feared that victim 
participation, particularly within the sentencing process, could introduce a new 
and unpredictable variable into the penalty equation and would jeopardise 
core principles such as just-deserts, proportionality, certainty and objectivity.24  
 
As Erez et al acknowledge, some commentators fear a ‗reversion to the 
retributive, repressive and vengeful punishment of an earlier age‘.25 Certainly, 
there are few who would dispute that it is imperative that, as a matter of public 
                                                          
20 Sweeting et al, ibid, 17. This may be particularly problematic where the information 
concerns the victim‘s previous convictions or involvement with gangs. 
21 H Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Waterloo, ON: Herald 
Press, 3rd ed, 2005). 
22 See eg. A Abramovsky, ‗Victim impact statements: Adversely impacting upon judicial 
fairness‘ (1992) 8 St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 21; A Ashworth, ‗Victims‘ Rights, 
Defendants‘ Rights and Criminal Procedure‘ in A Crawford and J Goodey (eds), Integrating a 
Victim perspective within Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 
23 See eg DJ Hall, ‗Victims‘ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint‘ (1991) 28 Am 
Crim L Rev 233; Y Buruma, ‗Doubts on the Upsurge of the Victim‘s Role in Criminal Law‘ in H 
Kaptein and M Malsch (eds), Crime, Victims, and Justice, Essays on Principles and Practice 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 
24 See further J Gardner, above n 13. 
25 E Erez, L Roeger, and F Morgan, above n 9. 
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policy, victims should not be allowed to use any locus standi they are granted 
to engage in a character assassination exercise against the accused. 
Inflammatory statements of hatred or an expressed desire for revenge could 
readily be subject to cheering from the public gallery or sensationalist 
reporting in the popular press. Considerable care does, however, need to be 
taken in making assumptions about what victims actually seek through 
participating in the criminal process. Whilst many victims may experience 
deep-seated feelings of anger and bitterness in the aftermath of an offence, 
studies have tended to suggest that victims would seem to be no more 
punitive than the general public in relation to their attitudes to sentencing by 
criminal courts.26 In their evaluation of the VPS pilots, Hoyle et al found that, 
‗rather than… encouraging exaggeration, inflammatory statements, and 
vindictiveness, the opposite appears to apply: they [victim personal 
statements] tend to understate rather than over-state the impact of 
offences.‘27 Similarly, Chalmers et al found that victim impact statements 
made as part of a Scottish scheme were often vague in terms of laying down 
specific demands. Some statements even showed that victims were 
concerned about ‗their‘ offenders and requested a lighter sentence.28 Studies 
into the motivations of victims participating in restorative initiatives have also 
found that far from seeking vengeance, most victims prioritise restitution or 
compensation over retribution.29 
                                                          
26 E Erez and P Tontodonato, ‗The Effect of Victim Participation in Sentencing on Sentence 
Outcome‘ (1990)28 Criminology 451; M Hough and A Park, ‗How malleable are attitudes to 
crime and punishment ? Findings from a British deliberative poll‘ in J. Roberts and M. Hough 
(eds), Changing Attitudes to Punishment. (Cullompton: Willan, 2002); J Mattinson and C 
Mirrlees-Black, Attitudes to Crime and Criminal Justice: Findings from the 1998 British crime 
Survey (London: Home Office, 2000). 
27 C Hoyle, E Cape, R Morgan, and A Sanders, Evaluation of the One Stop Shop and Victim 
Pilot Statement Projects (London: Home Office, 1998) at 28. 
28 Chalmers et al, above n 12, p 374. 
29 See eg C Hoyle, R Young, and R Hill, Proceed with Caution: An Evaluation of the Thames 
Valley Police Initiative in Restorative Cautioning (York: Rowntree, 2002); J Shapland, A 
Atkinson, H Atkinson et al, Restorative Justice in Practice—findings from the second phase of 
the evaluation of three schemes, Home Office Research Findings 274 (London: Home Office, 
2006); C Campbell, R Devlin, D O‘Mahony, et al, Evaluation of the Northern Ireland Youth 
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The tendency of the criminal law to prioritise the collective interests of society 
over those of individual victims is justified primarily on the basis that crime is 
harmful to society. The form of censure imposed by the courts thus 
symbolises a public denunciation of the offender‘s wrongdoing. Thus the 
individual desires of victims in relation to punishment– irrespective of whether 
they be forgiving or vengeful in their nature – risk usurping the key public 
interest values and objectives of the criminal justice system.30 This is a view 
that seems to have found favour in the higher courts, as Judge LJ explained 
in R v Nunn:31 
 
‗We mean no disrespect to the mother and sister of the deceased, but 
the opinions of the victim, or the surviving members of the family, about 
the appropriate level of sentence do not provide any sound basis for 
reassessing a sentence. If the victim feels utterly merciful towards the 
criminal, and some do, the crime has still been committed and must be 
punished as it deserves. If the victim is obsessed with vengeance, 
which can in reality only be assuaged by a very long sentence, as also 
happens, the punishment cannot be made longer by the court than 
would otherwise be appropriate. Otherwise cases with identical 
features would be dealt with in widely differing ways, leading to 
improper and unfair disparity, and even in this particular case…the 
views of the members of the family of the deceased are not absolutely 
identical.‘32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Conference Service NIO Research and Statistics Series: Report No. 12 (Belfast: Northern 
Ireland Office, 2006). 
30 See A Ashworth, ‗What Victims of Crime Deserve‘ paper presented to the Fulbright 
Commission on Penal Theory and Penal Practice, University of Stirling, September 1992; 
‗Some Doubts About Restorative Justice‘ (1993) 4 Criminal Law Forum 277; D Garland, 
Punishment and Modern Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 252; J 
Gardner, above n 13; Buruma, above n 23; R Coen ‗The Rise of the Victim—A Path to 
Punitiveness?‘ (2006) 16 ICLJ 10. 
31 R v Nunn [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 136. 
32 Ibid, 140. 
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While unpredictable variations in sentence would lead to a lack of certainty 
and be seen as undermining the rights of the accused, such a view may 
exaggerate the extent to which the consequences are likely to be unforeseen 
by the perpetrator.33 Nevertheless, the appellate courts have opted to tread 
cautiously in allocating weight to the views expressed by victims in relation to 
a sentence. In Perks,34 Garland J. reviewed the authorities and concluded 
that (a) any assertion that a victim had suffered as a result of the offence 
should be supported by evidence; otherwise, it should be inadmissible. 
Further, ‗[e]vidence of the victim alone should be approached with care, the 
more so if it relates to matters which the defence cannot realistically be 
expected to investigate‘.35 Moreover, 
 
‗the opinions of victims and/or their relatives as to what sentence 
should be passed should not be taken into account. The court must 
pass what it judges to be the appropriate sentence having regard to the 
circumstances of the offence and of the offender subject to two 
exceptions: (i) where the sentence passed on the offender is 
aggravating the victim‘s distress, the sentence may be moderated to 
some degree; and (ii) where the victim‘s forgiveness or unwillingness to 
press charges provides evidence that his or her psychological or 
mental suffering must be very much less than would normally be the 
case.‘36 
 
                                                          
33 H Fenwick, ‗Procedural Rights of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the 
Criminal Justice Process?‘ (1997) 60 MLR 317. 
34 [2001] 1 Cr App R (S) 19. 
35 Ibid, [H6], citing Lord Bingham CJ in R v Roche [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 105. Here, the 
offender pleaded guilty to causing the death of his cousin by careless driving while under the 
influence of drink or drugs. The Court of Appeal accepted a court might, as an act of mercy, 
reduce a sentence if the relatives of the victim indicated that the punishment imposed on the 
offender was aggravating their distress  
36 Ibid, [15]. These principles were later incorporated in Consolidated Practice Direction 
[2002] 1 WLR 2870.  
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Whilst the tenor of the decision in Perks was largely sceptical of the role that 
victims‘ emotions could play within sentencing, it was apparent from the 
decision that the impact of the offence, and degree of harm caused to the 
victim, were factors that could be legitimately considered. In other words, the 
Court had effectively acknowledged that the interests of the victim were part 
and parcel of the greater public interest.37 In the years since the Court of 
Appeal‘s decision, conceptions of criminal responsibility expanded to take 
even closer account of the nature of the harm or loss suffered (or threatened) 
to the victim. For example, Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
provides that for those convicted of murder the starting point of the minimum 
term should be a whole life or 30 years – i.e. longer than would otherwise be 
the case - where there is more than one deceased, and/or a child victim has 
been abducted or subjected to sexual or sadistic treatment; where an 
explosive has been used; or where the murder was committed for gain.38 
Each of these features clearly reveals that more harm has been caused or 
threatened beyond the loss of a life. Similarly, in relation to non-fatal offences 
of personal violence, the Sentencing Guidelines Council stressed that harm is 
a crucial indicator of offence gravity – ‗the seriousness of the offence… is 
determined by assessing the culpability of the offender and the harm caused, 
intended or reasonably foreseeable.‘39 Evidence can be admitted from 
medical and psychiatric experts of the harm caused through such offences, 
but simple logic dictates that the courts will invariably get a more 
comprehensive picture of the harm, not just to the immediate (or primary) 
victim but also to relatives and friends, from victim impact statements. 
 
                                                          
37 However, as Edwards has pointed out, there was no attempt to discern the nature of the 
relationship between the ‗public interest‘ and the interests of the victim: I Edwards, ‗The Place 
of Victims‘ Preferences in the Sentencing of ‗Their‘ Offenders‘ [2002] Crim LR 689. 
38 Criminal Justice Act 2003, Sch 21, paras 4-5.  
39 Sentencing Guidelines Council, Assault and other offences against the person: Definitive 
Guideline, (2008), cl 5. Other relevant statements in the Guideline include:- ―The use of a 
weapon….or part of the body (such as the head or other body part which may be equipped to 
inflict harm or greater harm…) will usually increase the seriousness…‖, (cl 22 – emphasis 
added).  
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Evidence of a greater willingness on the part of the Court of Appeal to give 
particular consideration to the emotional effects of victim harm in cases of 
domestic burglary is apparent from the remarks of Lord Phillips LCJ in the 
recent case of R v Saw & Ors.40 The focus of his remarks was very much 
directed towards the nature of the risk and the adverse consequences that an 
offender may produce when committing burglary, whether these are 
intentional, or not. Such effects relate not only to the emotional consequences 
of material loss, but also to the aggravating impact of the severe shock that 
victims often experience, especially the elderly, when intruders are known to 
be present, as well as its aftermath.  
 
In particular, the Court thought it unhelpful to compartmentalise the 
aggravating features of the offence in such cases into high or medium risk, or 
proceed on the basis that the appropriate sentence was a matter of 
aggregating such factors, as if it were ‗some kind of hypothetical, quasi-
mathematical calculation.‘41 Although specific guidance was clearly necessary 
on the ‗objective‘ impact of high and low risk factors for reasons of 
consistency of approach, sentencers should be free to address the realities of 
each case before them. In this, the Court appeared to accept the need for 
some adjustment in the balance of the penal equation towards the victim 
through more specific recognition of the harmful emotional effects of burglary, 
as against the state‘s retributive concerns for consistency and proportionality 
or indeed the offender‘s interest in construing offence seriousness as an 
accurate reflection of culpability. 
 
It may be argued that, in rejecting a formulaic approach towards calculating 
victim impact, the Court was implicitly recognising the need for sentencing 
discretion to take greater account of the state‘s obligation to the victim, and to 
the wider community, and, hence, to reflect the harmful psychological impact 
of burglary. Taken alone, cases such as Saw cannot be presumed to suggest 
a trend towards the sentencing process engaging with the issue of victim 
harm in a more participative sense. However, as with cases of murder and 
                                                          
40 [2009] EWCA Crim 1. 
41 Ibid, [20]. 
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personal violence, it suggests that the emotional consequences of victim harm 
is achieving more prominence as an indicator of offence seriousness. 
Accordingly, the need to take more explicit and effective account of it when 
sentencing for domestic burglary should be seen as a move in the right 
direction. 
  
III. The Impact of Shifting Parameters 
Just as the courts and policymakers have expanded the concept of criminal 
responsibility, there has been a parallel acknowledgement of the need to 
modify existing procedures to give the victim some means of participation. We 
suggest that there are four major factors that have come to exert pressure on 
the state / offender dichotomy that lies at the core of the adversarial conflict. 
These are: (1) evolving standards for victims in human rights law; (2) 
emergent participatory norms in international criminal justice; (3) the rise of 
‗therapeutic jurisprudence‘; and (4) the apparent collapse of the public / 
private divide within sentencing and penal policy.   
 
As we proceed to argue, it is the cumulative effect of these factors which, in 
our opinion, indicates a change, or softening, in the resistance against 
allowing greater expression of victim impact in sentencing. In particular, 
improving access to justice for victims has not only reflected developing 
trends in human rights and international criminal justice norms, but has also 
been balanced by a much greater recognition of the need for accountability. In 
other words, there is a broader acceptance that trial justice really does need 
to engage with victims‘ needs in a positive sense, and can no longer 
marginalise them for reasons of retributive ideology, or the exigencies of the 
adversarial contest. 
 
 
1) Evolving standards for victims in human rights law 
Although international instruments now require the interests of victims to be 
taken into account in a variety of ways, such standards tend to eschew 
P
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stipulating specific requirements concerning the role they ought to play in 
criminal proceedings. Even if many soft law instruments make some reference 
to the inherent value of participation, the language adopted by some of them 
tends to be vague and non-prescriptive. For example, Principle 6(b) of the UN 
Victims‘ Declaration provides that the judicial process should allow ‗the views 
and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages 
of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without 
prejudice to the accused.‘  
There has been only one occasion to date where the issue of victim 
participation in sentencing has arisen before the European Court of Human 
Rights. In McCourt v United Kingdom,42  the mother of a murder victim 
complained that the failure of the state to allow her to participate in the 
sentencing process constituted a violation of her right to privacy and family life 
under Article 8 of the Convention. Rejecting her complaint, the Commission 
found that the failure of the United Kingdom sentencing framework to provide 
a participatory mechanism did not reveal any lack of respect for her right to 
family life.43 In the Commission‘s view, those interests had been sufficiently 
protected when the Parole Board considered the question of early release. 
The decision was unsurprising, since the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Commission have traditionally shied away from laying down specific 
procedural requirements in cases concerned with domestic sentencing 
procedures. However, the Strasbourg Court itself is not averse to hearing the 
views of victims in their capacities as third parties. In T and V v United 
Kingdom,44 an application brought by those convicted of the murder of toddler 
Jamie Bulger, the parents of the victim were permitted to be present at the 
hearing and to make representations to the Court. Although the Strasbourg 
Court stopped well short of stipulating that this ought to be a requirement vis-
                                                          
42 App No 20433/92, 2 December 1992. Note, however, that the Court did highlight the fact 
that victims‘ opinions should be taken note of in the United Kingdom when the Parole Board 
decides on whether to grant early release. 
43 The Commission also rejected her complaint that denial of bereavement damages by the 
State also contravened Art 8.  
44 (1999) 30 EHRR 121. 
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à-vis the domestic criminal process, Rock cites the toddler‘s mother as saying 
that it was a ‗magnificent gesture‘ that she had been heard in this way since 
she had been precluded from doing so domestically.45  
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the Strasbourg Court will recognise a specific 
right for victims to participate in the sentencing process in the near future. It is 
perhaps more likely that the Court will continue steer a wide berth for some 
years to come since awkward conflicts may arise with the defendant‘s right to 
a fair and impartial hearing under Article 6(1).46 However, in the longer term, it 
is equally conceivable that some form of participatory right may emerge as 
Member States continue to make provision for it within domestic criminal law. 
John Jackson has argued that the jurisprudence from Strasbourg in recent 
years has effected a shift in the way we tend to categorise systems according 
to the adversarial or inquisitorial spectrum, arguing instead that the Court has 
developed a new model of proof that is better characterised as ‗participatory‘ 
than as ‗adversarial‘ or ‗inquisitorial‘.47 However, even if any participatory 
rights do emerge in future years, it is likely these would be limited in nature. It 
is difficult to conceive the Court advocating the more radical approach 
adopted in many parts of the USA which allows victims to make specific 
demands as to the length or type of sentence to be imposed.48  
It is not only the Strasbourg organs which have become increasingly receptive 
to the concept of victim participation. Article 3 of the EU Framework Decision 
requires each Member State to safeguard the possibility for victims to be 
heard during proceedings and to supply evidence, and to take appropriate 
measures to ensure that its authorities question victims only insofar as 
                                                          
45 P Rock, Constructing Victims’ Rights: The Home Office, New Labour and Victims (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004), 254. 
46 See further F Leverick, ‗What has the ECHR done for victims?‘ 11 IRV 177, 193. 
47 J Jackson, ‗The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards 
Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?‘ (2005) 68 MLR 737. 
48 B Emmerson and A Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2001), 18-78. Indeed, they further suggest that any such statement could infringe 
the accused‘s right to an impartial hearing under Art 6. 
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necessary for the purpose of criminal proceedings.49 Though the language 
adopted is imprecise, the requirements of the Framework Decision are of 
particular significance since they are legally binding on all Member States. 
Article 3 was one of the provisions which lay at the core of the recent decision 
of the European Court of Justice in the case of Pupino,50 where an Italian 
court refused to order a pre-trial examination for eight young child witnesses 
in a cruelty case brought against their teacher. The European Court of Justice 
held that the Framework Decision ‗must be interpreted as meaning that the 
national court must be able to authorise young children, who, as in this case, 
claim to have been victims of maltreatment, to give their testimony in 
accordance with arrangements allowing those children to be guaranteed an 
appropriate level of protection, for example, outside the trial and before it 
takes place.‘51 The Italian court was therefore under an obligation to interpret 
the terms of the Criminal Code ‗in the light of the wording and purpose of the 
Framework Decision.‘ 
While the Pupino decision was primarily concerned with the need to protect 
vulnerable witnesses rather than to enable the effective participation of victims 
generally, its relevance to the VFS should not be overlooked. The European 
Court of Justice has signalled that its days of sidestepping thorny questions of 
domestic criminal procedure are drawing to an end, and no Member State can 
consider itself exempt from the requirement that victims should be ‗heard‘. 
This will inevitably heighten the pre-existing tensions within the adversarial 
system. The extent to which the adversarial paradigm can effectively 
accommodate third party participatory rights is inherently limited, but the 
government might argue that the VFS represents one way of achieving this. 
Only time will tell whether that will be sufficient; future questions may well 
arise as to the overall effectiveness of the mechanism given that it is 
unavailable to the vast majority of crime victims.52 Whilst the construction of 
any imminent right to participate in sentencing might seem unlikely, it should 
                                                          
49 O.J. L 82, 22.03.2001. 
50 16 June 2005, in Case C-105/03. 
51 Ibid, para 61. 
52 The scheme is only available to certain victims in homicide cases – see discussion below. 
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be borne in mind that few would have foreseen the somewhat radical terms of 
the Pupino decision.  
 
2) Emergent participatory norms in international criminal justice 
As in human rights law, the formulation of new rules of procedure and 
evidence in international criminal justice has been seen by some as indicators 
of an emergent consensus on the types of values and rights that should lie at 
the forefront of the criminal justice system. 53 Although international trials deal 
with crimes which have been committed in a different social context and which 
are of a different magnitude from those typically encountered domestically, 
valuable lessons can still be learnt. There is, in particular, one common factor 
which justifies comparison. This is the need for the criminal process to engage 
with all those who are directly affected by trial justice, and by the wider 
audience which, in the case of international crimes, lies beyond territorial or 
state boundaries. Whether committed within or beyond such boundaries, the 
punishment of criminalised behaviours can only draw legitimacy if the kind of 
accountability established by the trial has a collective dimension. It is easier to 
see this where international trials are concerned because communities, racial 
or religious groups, and states appear more directly implicated. However, as it 
stands, international trial justice is constrained to produce ‗truths‘ largely 
founded on individual accountability and struggles, to engage with the nature 
of the collective reality of what took place and its consequences. This is also 
the case in domestic criminal justice, except here, while the greater focus on 
individual accountability is obvious, penal policy is more duplicitous in 
                                                          
53 The discussion here is restricted to the sentencing practices of the UN International 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR, respectively), and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). However, it should be borne in mind that their respective 
foundation instruments reflect distinct compromises between the procedural traditions of 
adversarial and inquisitorial trial. Some commentators argue that there has been considerable 
procedural ‗drift‘ away from adversarialism towards the more blended normative paradigm of 
the ICC; see R Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), ch 14. 
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asserting an engagement with victims and community, yet denying it in 
practice. 
 
One of the most striking victim-related developments on the international 
platform has been the degree to which victims are able to participate at the 
International Criminal Court. Although the regime is considered to be 
progressive by most commentators,54 it should be borne in mind that the 
potential scope for victim participation is much broader than is the case in the 
normal domestic context, irrespective of whether the form of trial is adversarial 
or inquisitorial. This is partly because the ICC‘s procedural innovations include 
pre-trial rights for victims dealing with investigatory and jurisdictional matters 
peculiar to the Court‘s remit.55 Nevertheless, it is certainly true to say that the 
ICC trial process engages with victims‘ ‗interests‘ to a much greater extent 
than most domestic systems of criminal justice in the developed world. 
 
Much attention has been devoted by the Trial Chambers of the ICTY/ICTR to 
the clarification of issues relating to the protection of witnesses and their 
anonymity.56 Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute,57 which governs the 
                                                          
54 See eg S Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); G Mekjian and M Varughese, ‗Hearing the victim‘s voice: analysis of 
victims‘ advocate participation in the trial proceeding of the International Criminal Court‘ 
(2005) 17 Pace Intl L Rev 1; J Doak, ‗Victims in the Criminal Process: An analysis of recent 
trends in regional and international tribunals‘ (2003) 23 LS 1. 
55 Article 15(3), ICC Statute permits victims to make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
with respect to any request made by the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation. Article 
19(3) provides that victims may submit observations to the Court with regard to proceedings 
relating to jurisdiction and admissibility. Further, by virtue of Article 53(1)(c), the Prosecutor 
may conclude, despite having taken the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims into 
account, that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. In such circumstances 
the Prosecutor must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a referral or the 
Security Council (as appropriate) of his or her conclusion and the reasons for it; Article 54(2). 
See generally, Section III, Victims and Witnesses, ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
56 See Prosecutor v Tadic (Case No. IT-94-I-T), Decision on the Prosecutor‘s Motion for 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 10 August 1995, paras. 62-6; Prosecutor v 
Blaskic (Case No. IT-95-14), Decision on the Application of the Prosecutor dated 17 Oct.1996 
requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 5 November 1996, para. 41. For 
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commencement and conduct of trial proceedings, requires Trial Chambers to 
ensure that they are conducted expeditiously in accordance with the rules of 
procedure and evidence, with due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses. Article 2258 goes on to provide that the ICTY ‗shall provide in its 
rules of procedure and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses‘. 
Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the 
conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim‘s identity. 
There has, however, been considerable criticism regarding the lack of any 
comprehensive witness protection programme. In consequence, a Victims 
and Witnesses Unit for the ICTY was established under Rule 34, but this 
encountered practical difficulties in obtaining improvements59 which have had 
a significant impact on the trial process. The ICC Statute, on the other hand, 
specifically provides for the creation of a Victims and Witnesses Unit within 
the Registry that is mandated to provide (in consultation with the Prosecutor‘s 
Office) protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other 
appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims appearing before the Court and 
others who may be at risk because of such testimony.60 
 
As regards the trial proper, Article 68 of the ICC Statute is especially 
significant.61 It provides a far more detailed account of the nature of victim and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
criticism see the debate between Christine Chinkin and Monroe Leigh in vols 90 / 91 of the 
American Journal of International Law. 
57 Article 19(1), ICTR Statute. 
58 Article 21, ICTR Statute 
59 These include problems relating to the lack of any definition of witness and when such a 
person might qualify for protection from the Unit, and the fact that contact is primarily with the 
Registry whereas the relationship of victims and witnesses with the Tribunal prior to trial is 
mainly through the Prosecution.                         
60 Article 43(6), ICC Statute. The position of victims is also strengthened by the creation of a 
Trust Fund to be administered according to criteria to be determined by the Assembly of State 
Parties. The Fund is established for the benefit of victims of crimes within the Court‘s 
jurisdiction and their families. Property collected through fines and forfeiture may be 
transferred to the Fund by order of the Court; Article 79, ICC Statute. 
61 Rule 86, ICC RPE contains a general injunction to the Trial Chamber and other Court 
organs when performing their functions under the Statute or Rules to take into account the 
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witness protection62 and their participation in the proceedings than does 
Article 22 of the ICTY Statute.63 For example, Article 68(1) provides that the 
ICC ‗shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses‘ and 
imposes obligations in this respect upon the Prosecutor. Significantly, the 
provision goes on to state that the measures taken are not to be prejudicial to 
or inconsistent with rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. This 
injunction is repeated in Article 68(3), which provides that the Court has the 
discretion to permit the views of victims and their concerns to be presented 
and considered at whatever stages in the proceedings it thinks fit, where the 
personal interests of victims are affected. 
 
The detailed implementation of these provisions is to be found in the ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence64 but, notwithstanding the procedural 
injunctions contained therein, there is nothing that obliges the Court to admit 
relevant victim evidence. Read in conjunction with Rule 145, which deals with 
the determination of sentence, the ICC provisions concerned with victims do 
not provide for their unconditional participation in any stage of the 
proceedings.  
 
Article 68 is conditional in several aspects. For example, the decision as to 
what constitutes ‗the personal interests of the victims‘ is left to the Court‘s 
discretion, as is the decision whether to admit the victims‘ views and concerns 
at all. Article 68(3) simply mandates the Court to ‗permit their views to be 
presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be 
appropriate by the Court’ and then goes on to qualify that possibility further by 
adding that any such presentation and admission must be ‗in a manner which 
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair 
                                                                                                                                                                      
needs of all victims and witnesses as directed by Article 68 especially children, elderly 
persons, persons with disabilities and victims of sexual or gender violence. 
62 See Rule 87, ICC RPE for details of their procedural implementation. 
63 Article 21, ICTR Statute. 
64 Section III, Subsection 3 Participation of victims in the proceedings, Rules 89-93. 
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and impartial trial.65 Rule 145(1)(C) merely obliges the Court to ‗give 
consideration‘ to (inter alia) the harm caused to victims and their families. 
There is no right for them to lodge a victim impact statement which must be 
taken into account in fixing the sentence.66 
 
In short, the ICC Trial Chamber‘s obligations do not extend beyond immediate 
victims within the jurisdiction of the court and their families67 to take on board 
                                                          
65 This is a necessary discretion to maintain balance between the competing rights of the 
parties. 
66 Further elaboration of the appropriate parameters for victim participation was recently 
provided by the ICC Appeals Chamber which confirmed that the harm suffered by victims 
within the scope of Rule 85 must be personal, although it does not necessarily have to be 
direct. Significantly, the Prosecutor resisted the idea put forward by victims‘ representatives 
that they had a personal interest in the establishment of the charges on the basis that this 
served to confuse the victims‘ role with that of the Prosecutor. The Appeals Chamber also 
determined that the harm and personal interests of victims in relation to their participation in 
the trial under Article 68 (3) ICC Statute must be linked to the charges against the accused. 
Consequently, once recognised as a victim under Rule 85, pursuant to Article 68(3), victims 
will first need to establish their personal interest in the trial before they are permitted to 
express their views and concerns (subject to the Court‘s discretion), although this must not 
prejudice or be inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Finally, 
the Appeals Chamber decided that victims may lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused and to challenge the admissibility of evidence in so far as this fulfils 
the purposes of the trial, subject to a number of procedural safeguards. However, this must 
take place within the parameters set by the charges in the indictment, since these establish 
the issues to be determined and thereby limit the Trial Chamber‘s authority; Judgment on the 
appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I‘s Decision on Victim 
Participation of 18 January 2008; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Prosecutor v 
Thomas Lubanga Dylio (Case No ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 A 10), 11 July 2008.  
67 Principle 2 of the UN Victims Declaration makes clear that a person may be considered a 
victim, regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or 
convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. 
This principle further clarifies that the concept of victim ‗also includes, where appropriate, the 
immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in 
intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization‘. Unfortunately, such 
clarification was not included by the drafters of the ICC provisions. See further commentary 
by Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Ensuring an Effective Role for 
Victims (AI Index: IOR 40/10/99). The fact that there are multiple victims may be taken into 
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the feelings and concerns of ‗significant others‘ within victim communities. No 
attempt has been to provide mechanisms to address what these wider 
concerns might be and how the Court might engage with them, or whether 
what is proposed has any sort of moral legitimacy in terms of the wider 
community. Furthermore, there is no apparent indication, either in any 
rationale discernable from the foundation instruments or any procedural 
mechanisms, whether what victims are allowed to put forward and its 
admission subject to the Court‘s discretion might (or should) contain 
information along these lines. Again, the concerns of victims and victim 
communities appear to receive symbolic rather than actual attention.68 
 
Whilst Zappalà is undoubtedly correct in suggesting that ‗… in the ICC Statute 
an attempt has been made to increase the procedural rights for victims and 
expand them to the procedural dimension‘,69 arguably such expansion has 
been more symbolic than concrete in its effects and has had little (if any) 
impact in addressing the fundamental philosophical and structural 
weaknesses affecting international criminal trials and sentencing.70 
  
More than symbolism is promised by Article 75 of the ICC Statute which 
enjoins the Court to establish principles relating to reparations to (or in respect 
                                                                                                                                                                      
account as an aggravating factor in the determination of sentence; Rule 145(2)(b)(iv) of the 
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
68 In this sense, therefore, it may be argued that the rights provided for are what Ashworth 
(1993) might describe as ‗service rights‘ rather than ‗procedural rights‘; A. Ashworth, ‗Some 
Doubts about Restorative Justice‘ (1993) 4 Crim LF 277. A distinction may be drawn in the 
characterisation of so-called ‗procedural rights‘ between those rights that allow for the 
possibility of some form of participation by victims, and those rights that mandate that 
possibility.  
69 Zappalà, above n 54. Whilst Zappalà does acknowledge certain practical drawbacks 
pertaining to the greater procedural participation possible for victims under the ICC regime (at 
p 232). 
70 For a summary; see R Henham ‗Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal 
Court‘ (2003) 52 ICLQ 81. 
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of) victims to include restitution, compensation71 and rehabilitation. It is clear, 
however, that reparations is employed as a concept which includes something 
analogous to civil damages and the restitution of property, or what Retzinger 
and Scheff72 refer to as ‗material reparation‘ in the context of restorative 
justice.73 Of much greater importance74 is the potential for ‗symbolic 
reparation‘ which, as Johnstone suggests,75 refers to a less visible process 
whereby the social bond between offenders and victims is repaired and 
restored through a process where shame and related emotions are evoked 
and acknowledged by the participants. It is equally apparent that the sense in 
which ‗rehabilitation‘ is used in Article 75 suggests a narrower 
conceptualisation that envisages material improvements for victims and 
communities as a necessary precursor to any kind of symbolic healing.  
 
The implications of these developments for procedural justice and victims‘ 
rights are profound. Although there has undoubtedly been increased 
recognition for victims in international trial processes, for these aspirations to 
become reality requires something more than an increased potential for 
change. In substantive and procedural terms this involves moving beyond the 
possibility of increased victim participation within the current normative 
                                                          
71 The issue of compensation for victims in relation to the ICTY was the subject of a working 
group; see further Eighth ICTY Annual Report, UN doc. A/56/352, 17 September 2001. 
72 S Retzinger and T Scheff, ‗Strategy for Community Conferences: Emotions and Social 
Bonds‘ in B Galaway and J Hudson (eds) Restorative Justice: International Perspectives 
(Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1996), at 315.  
73 In restorative terms, material reparation suggests a specified settlement between the 
parties, something not contemplated by Article 75, despite the fact that, according to Article 
75(3), the Court has a discretion to invite representations from ‗the convicted person, victims, 
other interested persons or interested States which it is obliged to take account of before 
making any order. 
74 As Zedner suggests, in practice such a dichotomy may be exaggerated. Mediation, for 
example, may lead to practical actions making good damage done and, therefore, its impact 
is also material; L Zedner ‗Reparation and Retribution: Are they Reconcilable?‘ (1994) 57 
MLR  226. 
75 G Johnstone, Restorative Justice: ideas, values, debates (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 
2002), 117.   
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framework (welcome as this may be) and moving towards a model of 
proactive engagement for victims.  
 
Similarly, for England and Wales, the main lesson to be learned from 
developments on the international stage is that the tensions and obfuscation 
caused by trying to accommodate victims‘ ‗interests‘ through such 
mechanisms as the victims‘ advocates scheme, particularly in the sentencing 
context, will not be dissipated unless there is greater clarity about what the 
purposes for victim engagement are and what it is meant to achieve. 
Arguably, as is the case with the ICC, the key lies in ensuring that: 
 
 The rights given to victims are ‗real‘ in the sense that their ‗interests‘76 are 
actually factored into sentencing decisions. 
 
 Sentencing judges are given the normative flexibility to achieve this. 
 
 A positive duty is placed upon the Court to ensure that victims‘ rights do 
not jeopardise the rights of the accused or threaten a fair and impartial trial 
process.77 
 
 An ideological shift takes place to underpin penal policy thereby allowing 
trials (and sentencing in particular) to maximise the normative flexibility to 
pursue more restorative outcomes for victims. Such an approach will make 
it easier for courts to reach beyond the immediate families of victims to 
take account of ‗interests‘ within the wider community when sentencing for 
serious crimes. 
 
                                                          
76 Clearly, the nature and scope of such ‗interests‘ and the purpose of victim participation 
need to be very carefully defined. One of the most important issues to be resolved is how 
these purposes might be linked to other sentencing aims and their achievement in concrete 
cases. 
77 In this the state should assume a greater responsibility for ensuring that the trial fulfils the 
legitimate expectations of its citizens for ‗justice‘. 
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3) The rise of ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’  
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the application of 
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) - particularly in the United States and Canada. 
TJ began life in the mid-1990‘s as a theory developed by Wexler and 
Winick.78 It postulates the psychological and emotional consequences of the 
legal process upon its primary stakeholders, and views the legal process as a 
social agent which is capable of both enhancing and diminishing one‘s 
emotional life and sense of psychological well-being.79 Whilst the field is still 
relatively underdeveloped and has been subject to criticism,80 it continues to 
grow rapidly. Today, TJ discourse is interdisciplinary in nature, and seeks to 
apply key aspects of psychological literature to legal procedures. Indeed, the 
field‘s rapid expansion has been propelled in part by an explosion in thematic 
research focusing on the role of emotions in both the biological and social 
sciences.81 Central to this ‗emotions‘ discourse is the idea that either oral or 
written accounts delivered in free narrative form can help reduce feelings of 
anger, anxiety and depression;82 bolster self-confidence;83 and even improve 
physical health.84 
 
                                                          
78 DB Wexler and BJ Winick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1996). 
79 D.B. Wexler, ‗Therapeutic jurisprudence forum: practicing therapeutic jurisprudence: 
psycholegal soft spots and strategies‘ (1998) 67 Rev Jur UPR 317. 
80 See eg C Slobogin, ‗Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder‘ (1995) 1 
Psychol Pub Pol'y & L 193, who contends that TJ has not provided a satisfactory means of 
balancing therapeutic values with other goals in the legal process. 
81 L Sherman, ‗Reason For Emotion: Reinventing Justice With Theories, Innovations, And 
Research—The American Society Of Criminology 2002 Presidential Address‘ (2003) 41 Crim 
1. 
82 See eg T Orbuch, J Harvey, S Davis, et al. ‗Account-Making and Confiding as Acts of 
Meaning in Response to Sexual Assault‘, (1994) 9 J Fam Violence 249; L Mills, ‗Killing her 
softly: Intimate abuse and the violence of state intervention‘ (1999) 113 Harvard L Rev 550. 
83 J Kellas and V Manusov, ‗What‘s in a story? The relationship between narrative 
completeness and adjustment to relationship dissolution‘ (2003) 20 J Soc Pers Relat 285. 
84 RD Enright and RP Fitzgibbons, Helping Clients Forgive: An empirical guide for resolving 
anger and restoring hope (Washington, DC: APA Books, 2000). 
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The exponential growth of TJ carries potentially major implications for the 
criminal justice system, some of which are already evident. Some of these are 
offender-based. Petrucci describes how certain crime prevention programmes 
in the United States have adopted cognitive behaviour techniques to help 
offenders develop empathy toward victims.85 Other aspects of TJ are more 
community-orientated or victim-orientated in nature: the recent proliferation in 
restorative justice and community courts are two such examples.86 However, 
much of TJ‘s early impact has been on the fringes of the system, with 
mainstream prosecution, trial and sentencing processes remaining largely 
untouched by any therapeutic concern.87 This should not surprise us: it is not 
at all clear precisely how the therapeutic goal fits into the much more deeply 
ingrained values that underpin the criminal justice system. Proponents of a 
more therapeutic approach to criminal justice contend that forgiveness, 
reconciliation, restoration, and emotional closure ought to feature alongside 
(or as alternatives to) the largely punitive objectives that have traditionally 
characterised western criminal justice systems.88 
 
Victims of crime are likely to be the stakeholders most likely to benefit from 
the ascendancy of TJ. The effects of victimisation – particularly from serious 
crime – are comprehensively documented, though it is widely recognised that 
the effects of victimisation vary considerably. The impact of crime will, of 
                                                          
85 CJ Petrucci, ‗Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting; Evidence for Including Apology as 
Additional Component in the Legal System.‘ (2002) 4 Behavioral Science and the Law 337. 
86 See respectively D Rottman and P Casey, ‗Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence 
of Problem-Solving Courts‘ (2000) National Institute of Justice Journal, July, 12-19; RF 
Schopp, ‗Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence‘ (1999) 67 Rev Jur 
UPR 665. 
87 See, however, the comments of Sully J in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in 
R v FD; R v FD; R v JD (2006) 160 A Crim R 392, where the function of victim impact 
statements to provide an ‗emotional catharsis‘ for victims was explicitly recognised. See 
further T Kirchengast, ‗Sentencing Law and the ‗Emotional Catharsis‘ of Victim‘s Rights in 
NSW Homicide Cases‘ (2008) 30 Syd L Rev 615. 
88 See eg E Erez, ‗Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing: Integrating Restorative 
Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceedings‘ (2004) 40 Crim 
LB 483. 
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course, vary according to the characteristics of individual victims; some 
victims will be seriously traumatised by what may appear to be a relatively 
trivial offence, whereas others may be able to find closure and healing soon 
after falling victim to a serious offence.89 However, often crime will carry with it 
some degree of emotional distress for a time after the offence, with victims 
often experiencing a loss of confidence or living in a state of fear of a 
repeated attack.90 
 
One of the primary means to find closure and overcome the trauma and 
anxieties caused by crime is through account-making. Indeed, contemporary 
psychotherapy and counselling practice is founded on the premise that 
externalising traumatic experiences through verbalisation constitutes an 
effective coping mechanism for many people facing upheavals from major life-
changing events, including violent crime.91 It follows that if victims are given 
an outlet through which they can channel their emotions, they may be able to 
recover from the effects of victimisation more readily. Through verbally 
representing past memories of trauma within a grander ‗life narrative‘, victims 
are better equipped to find closure and move on.92 
 
                                                          
89 J Shapland and M Hall, ‗What do we know about the effect of crime on victims?‘ (2007) 14 
IRV 175. 
90 For an excellent summary of relevant empirical studies, see Shapland and Hall, ibid. See 
also L Zedner and C Hoyle, 'Victims, Victimization, and the Criminal Process' in M. Maguire, 
R Morgan & R Reiner (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2007).  
91 See eg JW Pennebaker, Opening up: The Healing Power of Confiding in Others (New York: 
W Morrow, 1990); M White and D Epston, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends, London: 
WW Norton & Company, 1990); T Orbuch, ‗People‘s Accounts Count: The Sociology of 
Accounts‘ (1997) 23 Annual Review of Sociology 455. On overcoming particular problems 
facing homicide victims, see J Kenney, ‗Gender Roles and Grief Cycles: Observations of 
Models of Grief and Coping in Homicide Survivors‘ (2003) 10 IRV 19. 
92 M J Horowitz, Stress Response Syndromes (New York: Jason Aronson, 2nd ed, 1986). See 
generally K Harber and J Pennebaker, ‗Overcoming Traumatic Memories‘ in S Christianson 
(ed.), The Handbook of Emotion and Memory: Research and Theory (London: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1992). 
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Of course, the opportunity to give free accounts of such events is extremely 
curtailed within the formal criminal justice system. From prosecution through 
to sentencing and beyond, the criminal process serves to stifle free narrative 
and restricts the ability of victims to express themselves freely. At first sight, 
this may seem ironic, since the role of story-telling in the criminal trial was 
identified long before the ascendancy of therapeutic jurisprudence. Just as 
proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence advance the thesis that human 
beings need a coherent story frame to make sense of past experiences and 
overcome related emotional traumas, story-telling theory states that courts 
arrive at decisions by constructing stories based around the way the evidence 
is presented to them.93 Stories are used to enable the jury to identify the 
central action in the alleged crime; to make empirical connections among 
evidential elements based on that storyline; and to then interpret and evaluate 
those connections for internal consistency, completeness, and for their 
collective implications for the central action.94 However, in common law trial 
and sentencing processes, it is the advocates, rather than the victims in their 
capacity as witnesses, who assume the roles of story-tellers. The adversarial 
system has a tendency to ‗crush‘ the narratives of individuals,95 and, as Pizzi 
has stated, ‗turns witnesses into weapons to be used against the other side.‘96 
It is widely accepted that one of the primary goals of the advocate is to 
                                                          
93 See further WL Bennet and M Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom 
(Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981); N Pennington and R Hastie, ‗The Story Model 
for Juror Decision Making‘ in R Hastie (ed), Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror 
Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
94 Bennet and Feldman, ibid at 67.  
95 J Braithwaite, ‗Building Legitimacy Through Restorative Justice‘  in T Tyler (ed), Legitimacy 
and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007). 
96 W Pizzi, Trials Without Truth (New York: New York University Press, 1999), at 197. An 
interesting paradox, however, can be found in the case of professional expert witnesses. 
Concerns have been expressed that their testimony is incapable of being effectively 
challenged by the advocates who are not themselves familiar with the methodological basis 
for the expertise. To this end, the rules on the examination of experts were subject to a 
fundamental overhaul in Part 35 of the Criminal Procedure Rules (2005), which stipulates that 
the expert‘s duty to the court now ‗overrides‘ any duty to the instructing party (CPR r. 
35.3(2)). See further B Thompson, 'Watch this space' (2005) 155 NLJ 773-774; D Ormerod, 
'Expert evidence: where now? What next?' (2006) 5 Arch. News 5-9. 
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manipulate witness testimony in such a way that victory is made more likely, 
and the testimony must therefore be shaped to bring out its maximum 
adversarial effect.97 Indeed, a recent empirical study by Hall suggests that this 
is a prominent feature of criminal trials in England and Wales.98 Storytelling 
thus lies at the heart of the adversarial trial, except that the accounts are 
given by the advocates, and juries are invited to devise their own version of 
events based on those accounts. By contrast, victims have no opportunity to 
present their own account of past events, but are instead confined to 
answering questions within the parameters set down by the questioner. If 
proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence are correct, such a setting will 
necessarily limit the cathartic potential of the criminal process for the victim. 
The adversarial setting appears to be inherently limited in its capacity to 
deliver the types of curative effects identified by proponents of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. For this to be accomplished, new channels of communication 
between the victim, offender and the court are needed in order for meaningful 
account-making to take place. Not only might this change be of some 
cathartic value in itself, but would also constitute an official acknowledgement 
that the stories of victims matter. However, by the same token, there is a 
danger in attaching the 'therapeutic' label to criminal justice initiatives which, 
while promoting ‗participation‘ on paper, actually do very little in practice to 
encourage a form of participation that is both meaningful and effective in 
terms of catharsis. If we are serious about integrating a therapeutic agenda 
into criminal justice, we need to think in much more concrete terms about the 
ways in which participatory mechanisms are designed in order to reap a 
tangible sense of forgiveness, reconciliation and closure for victims of crime.  
Although TJ offers a new and refreshing perspective on the potential 
emotional and cathartic benefits of victim participation, the pervasive influence 
of retributive justice and the adversarial paradigm still appear to pose 
significant obstacles to their realisation. It would be foolhardy to transform the 
                                                          
97 W Pizzi, ibid. 
98 M Hall,Victims of Crime: Policy and practice in Criminal Justice (Cullompton: Willan, 2009), 
see esp. ch 6. 
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criminal justice system solely along therapeutic lines without giving due 
consideration to very real concerns among some commentators about the 
potential prejudice that such participation may entail. It is worth underlining 
that our arguments in this article our confined to bolstering the role of the 
victim at the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings. Special need for 
caution is needed within the trial itself, where the guilt of the accused remains 
an issue. In the pre-conviction phase of criminal proceedings, the status of the 
complainant ‗victim‘ is somewhat uncertain prior to the determination of the 
accused‘s guilt.99  
It is also suggested that much of the commentary concerning TJ has failed to 
propose any specific model for integrating the therapeutic agenda into 
contemporary forms of criminal process and sentencing. There has been little 
suggestion as to how the therapeutic goals might sit alongside (or compete 
with) a myriad of other criminal justice objectives, such as objective 
adjudication, the desirability of truth-finding, the preservation of the public 
interest, and the need to preserve fair trial rights. Indeed, one may well ask 
the question why a therapeutic agenda is necessary at all, given that 
immediate impact will be necessarily be limited to victims and offenders. The 
majority of witnesses are likely to have little or no personal interest in the 
therapeutic effects of the trial process.100  Nevertheless, the rapid growth of 
TJ within both legal and psychological discourse suggests that it is perhaps 
time to cease thinking of the pros and cons of victim participation in purely 
instrumentalist terms. Participatory rights may or may not assist the court in 
dispensing justice, but they may also empower victims through providing them 
with a means to channel their messages and stories to the offender, the court, 
and the wider community.101 Moreover, the growth of the discipline adds a 
                                                          
99 See further J Doak, 'Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation' (2005) 32 
JLS 294. 
100 Some commentators, however, have argued that in time, restorative practices may come 
to percolate social relationships and wider society. See eg. D. Sullivan and L. Tifft, 
Restorative Justice: Healing the Foundations of Our Everyday Lives (Monsey, NY: Willow 
Tree Press, 2005). 
101 See eg J Roberts and E Erez, ‗Communication in Sentencing: Exploring the Expressive 
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powerful stimulus to our argument that important shifts are taking place in the 
normative parameters of criminal justice which favour greater victim 
participation.   
 
4) The erosion of the public / private divide in sentencing 
 
As discussed earlier, the need for criminal process to better engage with the 
emotional impact of crime on victims is becoming increasingly discernible with 
regard to recent developments in international criminal justice. Although by no 
means perfect, the ICC has responded to this need by providing a radically 
new normative framework for victims. Despite clear differences in the notion 
of ‗penality‘ between international and domestic forms of criminal justice, there 
is no doubt that such international movements have been prompted by a 
gradual realisation that the future legitimacy of international trial justice 
depends on more concrete and relevant forms of engagement with victims 
and communities impacted by social conflict. Similarly, within domestic 
contexts, especially within transitional settings such as Northern Ireland, there 
is a need for the justificatory rhetoric of sentencing to connect more 
specifically with the interests and aspirations of victims and communities, and 
more broadly with the increasingly divergent views about the legitimacy of 
‗justice‘ within modern society.102 
 
Of course, conflicting views about the legitimacy of trial justice is nothing new. 
Its roots often lie in cultural tensions about the kinds of behaviour criminalised 
by law and, more particularly, differences in penal ideology and how criminal 
justice should reflect the ‗appropriate balance‘ between rights asserted by 
different social groups. The distinction between public and private interests in 
the criminal law is thus somewhat artificial, and has been so since its 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Function of Victim Impact Statements‘ 10 IRV 223, proposing a ‗communicative‘ model rather 
than an ‗impact‘ model for the incorporation of victim statements at sentencing. 
102 See further K McEvoy, ‗Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of 
Transitional Justice‘ (2007) 34 JLS 411. 
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inception during the Middle Ages.103 Indeed, a closer look at the actual nature 
of individual crimes and torts suggests that it is not so easy to neatly separate 
the public from the private interests. Despite the state‘s appropriation of the 
criminal conflict over time, it remains clear that civil and criminal liability are 
each based on overlapping concepts of fault, recklessness and strict liability, 
with many crimes having their equivalent in the law of tort.104 In this sense, 
public and private wrongs may be conceived as variations along the same 
continuum of fault;105 indeed this theoretical blurring is already reflected in a 
number of ways on both the domestic and international platforms. If concepts 
such as ‗harm,‘ ‗reparation‘ and ‗punishment‘ are viewed through a different 
lens, it may be that the sentencing objectives of the court could also take into 
account the restitutionary interests of the victim, without jeopardising the 
objectivity or denunciatory aspects of the penal system. 
 
The key to this may lie in how the criminal process is able to respond to 
changing perceptions of ‗fault‘ in the criminal law. If the concept of ‗fault‘ 
remains firmly tied to establishing individual criminal responsibility, sentencing 
will accordingly remain rooted to notions of blame, censure and retributive 
justice. However, if the changing balance between public and private interests 
is thought of as a foundational shift in the social contract between citizen and 
state, then the criminal law and criminal process should reflect this through 
changed notions of responsibility. In other words, criminal justice can be 
conceived as moving back towards a more collective form of accountability for 
those whose behaviour is labelled as crime. In this sense, the changes in the 
balancing of interests within the criminal law and criminal process that are 
taking place reflect a recapturing of the shared morality by which communities 
accept the criminalization of certain behaviours, and how they should be 
punished. Hence, not only is the notion of ‗victim‘ being broadened to focus 
                                                          
103 See further A Ashworth, ‗Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and the 
State‘ (1986) 6 OJLS 86. 
104 A Goldstein, ‗Defining The Role Of The Victim In Criminal Prosecution‘ (1982) 52 Miss LJ 
515, 530. 
105 D Weisstub, ‗Victims of Crime in the Criminal Justice System‘ in E Fattah (ed) From Crime 
Policy to Victim Policy (London: Macmillan, 1986), 206. 
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more on the concept of harm than culpability, but also, the communitarian 
basis for the criminalization of certain actions and their consequences begin 
to assume a greater significance in the penal equation. Harm, it is submitted, 
should not be seen in purely objective terms, but should instead be related to 
victim and community perceptions of wrongdoing and the moral 
consequences of those judgments for those charged with delivering justice in 
the courts. In this way, the community becomes more directly responsible for 
the definition of harm and how to deal with its consequences through the 
criminal process.   
To some extent, this trend towards a broader understanding of criminal harm 
is already discernible. As previously noted, conceptions of criminal 
responsibility within sentencing have expanded to take much closer account 
of the nature of the harm or loss suffered (or threatened) to the victim. This 
trend is even more marked when we consider the form of penalty that the 
criminal justice system is willing to impose. Since 1972 criminal courts have 
had the power to order an offender to pay a victim compensation for ‗any 
personal injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence‘,106 and courts are 
now obliged to consider whether it would be desirable to make a 
compensation order and must give reasons for refusing to do so.107 Field and 
Roberts argue that a ‗subtle but important shift‘ has taken place, whereby the 
criminal justice system is becoming increasingly geared ‗toward a more 
interactive relationship between the individual rights of victims and their 
families on the one hand, and collective interests on the other.‘108 This 
                                                          
106 The court may make a compensation order, instead of, or in addition to, any other penal 
sanction. Where the offender has insufficient means to pay both, the court shall give 
preference to the compensation order (section 130(12) Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000). The powers were originally set out in Criminal Justice Act 1972. 
107 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 130. Section 130(4) of the Act states 
that compensation ‗shall be of such amount as the court considers appropriate, having regard 
to any evidence and to any representations that are made by or on behalf of the accused or 
the prosecutor, the Court.‘  
108 S Field and P Roberts, ‗Racism and Police Investigations: Individual Redress, Public 
Interests and Collective Change after the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000‘ (2002) 22 
LS 493, 495. See also Fenwick, above n 33. 
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relationship is also evidenced by the rapid ascent of restorative justice 
initiatives in recent years. Over the course of the past decade, such projects 
have gained a firm foothold in Britain and have been mainstreamed as the 
central response to youth offending in Northern Ireland.109  
This shift towards the privatisation of criminal justice does not sit easily with 
the distinction traditionally drawn by the common law between public and 
private interests. However, it would now seem that such a neat separation is 
difficult to justify in logical terms. In view of the pace of recent developments, 
we should perhaps pause to consider whether the private interests of victims 
can be adequately encapsulated in purely monetary forms such as civil 
damages, criminal compensation orders and, indeed, state-based 
compensation for criminal injuries. As Walther explains:    
 
‗The variety of terms we encounter reflects the difficulty inherent in 
defining what ‗making good‘ to the victim is actually about, and sheds 
light on the awkward, doctrinally unresolved standing of the victim‘s 
interests between the spheres of private and public law. This difficulty 
is easily obfuscated if we borrow a term from ‗civil‘ or ‗private‘ law and 
try to redefine it as an umbrella term for ‗making amends‘ to a victim of 
crime. Both the terms ‗restitution‘ and ‗compensation‘ are too narrowly 
predefined by civil law to properly serve this purpose. Although the 
term ‗reparation‘ also exists in civil law, it appears better suited for the 
umbrella function since, unlike ‗restitution‘ and ‗compensation‘, it does 
not per se predetermine the modalities of making good.‘110 
 
Viewing reparation in this way, the task of ‗,making good‘ could be achieved 
through various non-pecuniary means. On the international platform, the 
concept of reparation for victims of abuse of power is generally 
                                                          
109 For an overview, see J Dignan, Understanding Victims and Restorative Justice 
(Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill / Open University Press, 2005), ch 4. See also D Roche, 
Accountability in Restorative Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Ch 1. 
110 S Walther, ‗Reparation and Criminal Justice: Can they be integrated?‘ (1996) 30 Israel 
Law Review 316, 320. 
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conceptualised in a much broader and more flexible way. Apologies, 
explanations, guarantees of non-repetition, and the uncovering of truth are 
examples of how wider and more communitarian forms of reparation have 
begun to penetrate our understanding of state crime and human rights 
abuses.111 In drawing from these rapidly expanding discourses, a newly 
configured criminal justice system could distinguish itself from traditional 
doctrinal conceptions of compensation and restitution as developed by both 
the civil and criminal limbs of the common law. This more flexible concept of 
reparation could potentially address a much wider set of aims above and 
beyond either criminal compensation orders or the law of tort. Instead, the 
resolution of the victim / offender conflict would be reconceptualised as part of 
the wider public interest, since the community is made up of ‗victims, potential 
victims and the fellow citizens of victims.‘112 Indeed, victims would not be the 
only beneficiaries of such an approach. The injection of a civil interest into the 
somewhat elusive concept of the ‗public interest‘ could lend additional 
legitimacy to the outcome of the case, thereby benefiting the criminal justice 
system as a whole. By the same token, Weisstub also contends that the civil 
justice system could benefit from infusing itself with the symbolism of criminal 
sanctions, thereby showing itself to be ‗consonant with public morality and 
conscience.‘113 
 
IV. The VAS / VFS in Context 
Although there may be signs of a re-balancing of the public/private interest 
towards victims, the rigidity of adversarial trial and the retributive justice model 
continue to act as significant obstacles to more comprehensive reform. 
Arguably, the prospects for victim participation and the development of 
restorative justice strategies are unlikely to be further advanced within the 
                                                          
111 See further Doak, above n 18, Ch6. 
112 Cavadino and Dignan, above n 11, p 237. 
113 Weisstub, above n 105, p 207. 
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constraints imposed by proportionality and deserts-based ideology,114 
Nevertheless, the VAS has been presented as a genuine attempt by the 
executive to confront this apparent impasse in the development of penal 
policy.  
At first glance, it may appear that the national roll-out of the VFS broadly 
reflects the above-mentioned shifts in human rights discourse, international 
criminal justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and changing dynamic in the 
relationship between individuals and the state. There may be a temptation to 
conclude that, through giving victims a ‗voice‘ in the criminal justice system 
along the lines proposed by the Government, satisfaction rates and 
perceptions of legitimacy in the sentencing process would receive a much 
needed boost. The scheme was, after all, promoted in the following terms by 
the Lord Chancellor:115 
‗We want victims to be heard properly and fully in court… We want to 
give victims a voice directly in court. We want to end the culture of 
silence which can envelop victims and their families. We want to tear 
down that veil of silence – and let the voice of the victim be heard‘. 
However, Sweeting et al‘s evaluation of the VAS broadly confirmed what has 
been found elsewhere,116 that the impact statements seemed to have very 
little influence on sentencing, that they provided a modest degree of 
satisfaction to victims‘ families, and that they were not liked by some legal 
                                                          
114 Furthermore, the fragmentation of process through the introduction of discrete structures 
for dealing with particular forms of offender or offending behaviour understandably does little 
to advance the cause of integration, either in theory or practice. As the Italian experience 
suggests, changes in structure and form without a corresponding re-evaluation in the overall 
purposes of prosecution, trial and sentence beyond a basic need to remedy procedural 
deficiency produce penal structures whose philosophical justifications are impossible to 
reconcile within the existing stated aims of punishment, and the legislative model which 
embodies them; R Henham and G Mannozzi, ‗Victim Participation and Sentencing in England 
and Italy: A Legal and Policy Analysis‘ (2003) 11 Eur J Crime Cr L Cr J 278. 
115 Department of Constitutional Affairs, Hearing the Relatives of Murder and Manslaughter 
Victims (London: Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2005), at 4. 
116 See Hoyle et al, above n 27; Chalmers et al, above n 13. 
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practitioners and judges. One particular problem with telling victims that they 
have been provided with a ‗voice‘ is that victims will expect it to carry 
considerable weight in the sentencing decision. Under the VAS, like other 
forms of victim impact statement previously tested in England and Wales, this 
is invariably not the case. The legal purpose of such mechanisms is simply to 
give the sentencer a more accurate picture of the impact of the offence.117 As 
past empirical evaluations of various types of participatory initiatives have 
found, this situation leaves victims rather confused about the purpose or 
function of such schemes.118 It was therefore perhaps unsurprising that 
Sweeting et al arrived at similar conclusions in respect of the VAS; the 
researchers found that there was a lack of clarity and awareness on the part 
of victims as to the purpose and rationale of the mechanism.  
It may be that victims‘ understandings of the scheme‘s operation has been 
influenced by the political rhetoric used to promote the scheme. Rock has 
noted that a leaflet given to the families in the VAS pilots informed them that: 
‗[t]hese statements give the families of murder and manslaughter 
victims a voice in the criminal justice system. Making a statement 
enables you to tell the court about how the murder or manslaughter 
has affected your family.‘119  
Although a revised leaflet issued in February 2007 purported to make it clear 
that specific penal demands should not be made by families, Sweeting et al 
reported that most victims simply kept it for reference purposes only.120 Some 
nine years ago, when victim impact statements were first piloted in Britain, 
Edna Erez remarked that the English model for facilitating participation of the 
victim in sentencing makes little real difference to either victims or defendants 
                                                          
117 See The Victim’s Advocate Protocol issued by the President of the Queen’s Bench 
Division Setting Out the Procedure to be Followed in the Victims’ Advocate Pilot Areas 
(2006), appended in Sweeting et al, above n 19. 
118 See eg Hoyle et al, above n 26; Chalmers et al, above n 13. 
119  Rock, above n.19, pp 9-10. 
120 Sweeting et al, above n 19, p 17. 
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in the criminal justice system.121 Despite the national roll-out of the Victim 
Personal Statement Scheme, and the new measures contained in the Victim 
Focus Scheme, that analysis remains accurate. 
The scheme is extremely limited in its scope. It applies only to a tiny 
proportion of victims (namely the families of homicide victims) who come to 
deal with the criminal justice system. Even then, it is unclear just who may 
claim to be a ‗victim‘ for the purposes of providing a statement.122 One 
particular conundrum is posed by the fact that relatives of the deceased are 
likely to have been affected by the offence in different ways, and may not 
agree with one another on the nature and extent of the harm.  For example, in 
cases of intra-familial homicide, including so-called ‗honour killings‘ and 
‗mercy killings‘, it would not be unheard of for family members to hold very 
different perspectives on the rights and wrongs of the perpetrator‘s actions 
and the extent to which he or she should be punished. While Legal Guidance 
issued by the Crown Prosecution Service envisages that meetings with more 
than one ‗victim‘ may be required, it is also made apparent that multiple victim 
personal statements should generally be avoided.123 Where the interests of 
different victims cannot be reconciled, it is unclear how the court should go 
about determining which components of which statement(s) to accept for the 
purposes of imposing a sentence.    
 
A further divisive aspect of the scheme stems from the fact that it appears to 
have created an artificial hierarchy among victims, insofar as only families of 
homicide victims may rely on it. The vast majority of victims will still have no-
one to advance their views in the sentencing process. This limitation may, 
                                                          
121 E Erez, ‗Integrating A Victim Perspective In Criminal Justice Through Victim Impact 
Statements‘ in A Crawford and J Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective Within 
Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 
122 See further C Brennan, above n10. Indeed, the task of constructing ‗victims‘ generally can 
be fraught with difficulty, and there is no authoritative definition that can be applied across the 
legal order. See further Doak, above n 18, ch1.  
123 Crown Prosecution Service, ‗Victim Focus Scheme Guidance on Enhanced CPS Service 
for Bereaved Families‘, para 27. Available: 
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prima facie, seem justifiable on the ground that deceased victims – unlike 
those who have survived - will never be able to tell their stories in court. 
However, as we argued above, the adversarial system does not afford victims 
a realistic prospect of telling their stories at all. If one accepts that there is 
some value to the fact-finding process in allowing a certain category of victims 
to provide direct accounts to the sentencer, then surely the same logic 
dictates that all victims ought to be able to do so.  
 
The limited nature of the scheme is perhaps unsurprising, given the narrow 
rationale which underpins it. The VFS is designed purely to afford the 
sentencer with a more accurate picture of past events. It is unfortunate that, 
despite the ascendancy of therapeutic jurisprudence and our expanding 
understanding of reparation, the scheme continues to conceptualise crime as 
an offence committed primarily against the state. Far from expanding the 
parameters of the criminal justice system to take account of the needs of 
victims and communities, the scheme as it stands serves to entrench the 
victim‘s position as a servant or agent of the state.124 Like many other recent 
initiatives promoted in the name of ‗victims‘, the Victim Advocate Scheme has 
arguably been a product of astute political manoeuvring rather than a genuine 
willingness on the part of policymakers to engage in looking for ways to 
bolster the role of victims in the criminal justice system.125 This focus on what 
Bottoms has labelled ‗populist punitiveness‘126 has ultimately meant that 
efforts to identify and remedy the structural problems and complex value-
based questions have been significantly hampered. 
 
The adversarial paradigm remains, at its core, fundamentally ill-equipped to 
provide a platform for the meaningful participation of victims, let alone heal 
individual conflicts between victims and offenders. Indeed, Sweeting et al‘s 
analysis of the scheme seemed to hint (albeit in somewhat vague terms) that 
                                                          
124 Faulkner, above n 14. 
125 See further J Jackson, ‗Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?‘ 
(2005) 30 JLS 309, 313; Doak, above n 18, ch 1; M Hall, above n 98, pp 80-83. 
126 A Bottoms, ‗The philosophy and politics of punishment and sentencing‘ in C. Clarkson & R. 
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the adversarial environment was incapable of sustaining any therapeutic 
function. The researchers described the family impact statement scheme as, 
 
‗an effort to construct a favourable public representation of the victim 
and his family, its medium could be a form of disjointed story-telling 
consisting of pointed anecdotes….and its audience was variously 
intended to be the defendant, the judge (who sometimes – but not 
always – acknowledged what was said at the point of sentencing), the 
jury and the wider world who were invited to understand the family‘s 
extraordinary loss, desolation and isolation.‘127 
Whilst practitioners were aware of the fact that the family impact statement 
could not influence the actual sentence, a number of them nonetheless did 
recognise its potential for catharsis.128 This highlights the distinction drawn by 
Roberts and Erez between so-called ‗communicative‘ models of victim 
participation and ‗impact‘ models.129 As both the VAS and its successor, the 
VFS, stand, it is unclear whether they are primarily orientated towards 
catharsis or are intended simply to give the sentencer a better picture of past 
events. In either case, as Sweeting et al recommended, it is clear that victims‘ 
expectations must be managed, and they need to be made aware of the 
nature and extent of their input if the scheme is to be regarded as an effective 
and legitimate means of giving them a voice.130 
If, however, policymakers did intend that catharsis should form at least part of 
the objective of the VAS, then the proposed VFS appears to be a peculiar way 
of achieving it. Under the original VAS, victims could either give an oral 
statement themselves, or through their advocate. Yet under the VFS, this 
provision is no longer in place. If victims wish to exercise their right to be 
heard, they now may only do so through their counsel. The removal of the 
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ability of victims to be able to deliver a narrative in person was most probably 
calculated to avoid the risk of inflammatory statements, but it will undoubtedly 
undermine any therapeutic potential that direct account-making might have 
held. Although Sweeting et al found that the majority of families had asked for 
the statements to be read by the prosecutor or judge, a significant minority 
(22%) had opted to present them in person. This was an opportunity that 
appeared to be valued by the families who did so, with the husband of one 
deceased victim telling the researchers that he was ‗doing it because I just felt 
I owed it.‘131 Moreover, the researchers noted that overcoming the fear of 
speaking in court on such an emotional subject had helped victims to feel 
empowered and more satisfied with the process. It was also reported that 
there was a perception among practitioners that family members felt they 
could have a greater personal impact and ‗do more to help‘ by delivering the 
FIS themselves. Although self-delivery of the statement tends to involve 
additional work for all stakeholders, it is regrettable that the therapeutic 
potential of the VFS has been curtailed by placing restrictions on the victim‘s 
role, rather than seeking to strengthen it. 
 
As recent experience with the ICC illustrates,132 effective engagement with 
victims, especially when gauging the impact of emotional harm, should be 
conceived in more holistic terms, to include both pre and post trial phases. 
Seen against this background,133 domestic initiatives such as the VAS and 
VFI represent very small advances in the notion of victim participation. Unlike, 
the ICC, there are no pre-trial rights of participation which, in the domestic 
context, could provide the right for victims to present testimony having a direct 
bearing on charging decisions, subject to the rights of the accused and the 
need for a fair and impartial trial. Similarly, the right of victims in ICC trials to 
lead or challenge evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused 
within the framework of agreed charges, and subject to appropriate fair trial 
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safeguards, also envisages a more interventionist role.134 Paradoxically, the 
normative detachment of victims in adversarial trial from the pursuit of 
economic as well as criminal justice goals renders them more ‗acceptable‘135 
parties to the criminal process, yet advances for victims in international trial 
procedure have been achieved against the background of a perceptible shift 
away from the adversarial model in its archetypal form.136  
 
Notwithstanding, these advances reflect a greater realisation of the 
international trial‘s transitional justice role, and its wider role as a fundamental 
pillar of governance in criminal justice. There are clear parallels here for 
domestic trial justice. For instance, it may be argued that shifts away from 
repressive forms of justice towards more hybridised forms of trial process are 
also transitional, in the sense that they represent a positive response to the 
failure of trial justice to engage with the justice expectations of the diverse 
groups and communities that comprise contemporary society. In this sense, 
therefore, fulfilling victims‘ rights of participation may symbolise a crossroads 
for trial justice. 
 
 
Conclusion  
The failure of the VFS to address the victim‘s therapeutic needs in a practical 
sense is a retrograde step. Paradoxically, however, it lends support to 
Sherman‘s case for an ‗emotionally intelligent justice system‘.137 Sherman 
envisages such a system working ‗like an emotionally intelligent political 
campaign or product marketing plan, one that is likely to employ 
disaggregated strategies based on research evidence about what  messages 
                                                          
134 In the domestic context, this would challenge the adverse consequences of the adversarial 
distinction between verdict and sentence on establishing the factual basis for sentence. 
135 In the sense that their evidence is less likely to be perceived as tainted by an economic 
motive than in the pursuit of establishing the ‗truth‘ of the events which constitute the facts 
alleged in the indictment. 
136 See further K Ambos, ‗International Criminal Procedure: ‗Adversarial‘, ‗Inquisitorial‘ or 
Mixed?‘ (2003) 3 Int CLR 1. 
137 Sherman, above n 81. 
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or methods work best for each type of audience‘.138 However, it is not 
sufficient that normative changes reflecting demands for greater accountability 
are based solely on empirical evidence. As Hudson suggests, in order to ‗do 
justice to difference‘,139 in a coherent and practical way through the 
sentencing process, a radical change in penal ideology is required.  
 
The shifts in the moral foundations which underpin concepts of fault and 
responsibility in the criminal law that we have discussed, and the changing 
relationship between what citizens receive and what they expect from the 
state in the administration of justice, suggest a gradual lessening in traditional 
resistance to ideological change. It is equally true to say that the benign 
influence of changes in international trial justice and international human 
rights standards alone are insufficient. One thing is certain, however; when 
procedures are viewed as fair, they will have a positive, therapeutic effect on 
the people involved, whereas when procedures are viewed as unfair they will 
have a negative, anti-therapeutic effect.140 Making victim participation a 
‗meaningful‘ reality involves recognising the crucial link between the perceived 
morality of the ideology which underpins criminal justice and perceptions of its 
fairness as an everyday reality by victim and the communities where they live. 
In a recent presidential address to the American Society of Criminology, 
Lawrence Sherman stated that a new window of opportunity is opening for 
criminology to reinvent justice, fuelled by widespread dissatisfaction with 
current practices and their costs.141 We believe that observation was 
particularly apt. The time may be ripe for criminology to advance a new 
paradigm of justice, which conceptualises crime in a different way; and seeks 
                                                          
138 Ibid, citing D. Massey, ‗Presidential Address. A Brief History of Human Society: The Origin 
and Role of Emotion in Social Life‘ (2002) 67 ASR 1. 
139 B Hudson, 'Doing Justice to Difference' in A Ashworth and M Wasik, (eds) Fundamentals 
of Sentencing Theory (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1998) 
140 See J Wemmers and K Cyr, ‗Can Mediation be Therapeutic for Crime Victims ? An 
Evaluation of Victims‘ Experiences in Mediation with Young Offenders‘ (2005) 47 Can J 
Criminol Crim Justice 527; EA Lind and K Van den Bos, ‗When fairness works: Toward a 
general theory of uncertainty management‘ (2003) 24 Res Organ Behav 181; R MacCoun, 
‘Voice, Control and Belonging' (2005) 1 Ann Rev Law & Soc Sci 171. 
141 Sherman, above n 81,  
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to bolster legitimacy through promoting the effective participation of victims 
and communities.142 While recent years have seen commentators become 
bolder in suggesting ways in which this might be accomplished,143 a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the values and structures of criminal justice 
system by policymakers remains an indeterminate prospect. 
                                                          
142 This article has focused on the desirability of victim participation within criminal justice, but 
many commentators have also recognised the need for effective community engagement. 
See eg. A Crawford, ‗The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the 
Communitarian Agenda‘ (1996) 23 JLS 247, The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to 
Community and Partnerships (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); D O‘Mahony and J Doak, ‗The 
Enigma of Community and the Exigency of Engagement: Restorative Youth Conferencing in 
Northern Ireland‘ (2006) 4 BJCJ 9; G. Pavlich, 'The Force of Community' in H Strang and J. 
Braithwaite (eds.), Restorative Justice and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
143 See eg  M Cavadino and J Dignan, ‗Towards a Framework for Conceptualising and 
Evaluating Models of Criminal Justice from a Victim‘s Perspective‘ (1996) 4 IRV 153; Pizzi, 
above n 96; L Walgrave, ‗Restorative Justice and the Law: Socio-Ethical and Juridical 
Foundations for a Systemic Approach‘ in L Walgrave (ed) Restorative Justice and the Law 
(Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2002); J Jackson ‗The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal 
Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?‘ (2005) 68 MLR 
737; Doak, above n 18. 
Post-Pri t
